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uring the last decade, animal
protection suffered a pro-
found setback as a result of
global trade rules. Until recently, the
harm has remained almost invisible
to the general public because interna-
tional trade has seemed only tangen-
tially related to animal protection.
Much like Magellan, whose great
ships appeared on the horizon of
Terra del Fuego yet remained unseen
by the natives,1 an elite few have been
making global trade rules out of sight
of the rest of the world—acting as an
invisible hand affecting economic and
social policy.
However, that is beginning to
change, and animal issues are playing
a crucial role in making the World
Trade Organization (WTO), the inter-
national body responsible for initiat-
ing and enforcing global trade rules,
publicly visible. Current WTO rules
prohibit the types of enforcement me-
chanisms relied upon by sovereign
nations to make animal protection
initiatives effective; as a result, many
animal protection measures in this
country and abroad have been re-
versed or stymied in the face of WTO
challenges or threatened challenges.
The WTO’s adverse impact on animal
protection is one of the reasons why
the WTO’s new-found public image is
increasingly a negative one.
Where We 
Are Now 
The Third WTO Ministerial in Seattle,
Washington, in December 1999, dra-
matically revealed for the first time
many segments of the public’s grow-
ing discontent with WTO rules.2 An
attempt to launch a new round of
trade negotiations3 ignited street
clashes between protesters, including
some in sea turtle costumes (to sym-
bolize the WTO’s anti-environment
policies), and law enforcement offi-
cials. The protesters, flashed across
television sets around the globe.4 The
ministerial meeting collapsed as a re-
sult of the upheaval, and sea turtles
quickly became a symbol in Seattle of
what is wrong with the WTO.5
Laws protecting sea turtles,6 dol-
phins,7 and dogs8; laws banning cos-
metic testing on animals9 or the use
of steel-jaw leghold traps10; laws pro-
moting the production of hormone-
free beef11—all have been challenged
or threatened with challenge as a bar-
rier to trade under WTO rules or its
precursor, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In each
case, when global trade rules were
applied, the laws were modified or re-
voked. These laws represent decades
of effort to establish strong animal
protection legislation in the United
States, Canada, and Europe. 
At stake is the democratic steward-
ship of animals and their environ-
ment. Global trade rules govern not
only trade, but also the values a coun-
try reflects within its marketplace.
WTO supporters say that the WTO
Agreements permit countries to set
high environmental and social stan-
dards. But WTO and GATT case law
demonstrate the Orwellian nature of
this statement. Under WTO rules, an-
imals cannot be protected if protec-
tion results in any adverse market
impact.12 In effect, free-market theo-
ry preempts all other social values.
The WTO does not specifically pro-
hibit governments from establishing
strong animal protection or environ-
mental policy, as WTO supporters
point out. The effect is more subtle.
WTO rules narrow the range of mech-
anisms available to governments to
create or modify social policy. Specif-
ically, WTO rules prohibit govern-
ment-initiated, market-based reme-
dies such as sanctions, standards, and
even ecolabeling, if they are used to
implement and enforce animal pro-
tection and environmental policies.13
Yet today, much of the harm done to
animals and the environment is the
result of market-based problems—in-
cluding fishing for tuna by killing dol-
phins, factory farming, and scientific
research on animals to reduce prod-
uct liability. In each case the ultimate
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Conflict or
Compromise?
Government policy is meaningless if
no viable ways exist of implementing
and enforcing its substantive provi-
sions. In the context of global eco-
nomic integration, this realization 
in part, led to the strengthening of
the institutional and enforcement
provisions of the WTO.14 Similarly,
without viable options for implement-
ing and enforcing animal protection
policy, including market-based reme-
dies, the sovereign authority to set
high anima protection standards is an
anachronism.
The 1990s were characterized by
conflict and competition initiated as
GATT/WTO proponents sought to im-
pose a dominant global economic
order. A strategy of “winner take all”
was pursued,15 and it extended to
challenges to animal welfare.16 Princi-
ples of free trade, not pragmatism,
governed decisions to challenge legit-
imate animal welfare laws.17 The pub-
lic seemed asleep. Free market theo-
rists had free rein. But by 1999 the
climate was changing, as demonstrat-
ed by the broad public interest piqued
by the protests against the Seattle
Ministerial. The question for the new
millennium is whether compromise
can be found. 
Each new WTO challenge to an
existing national or international pol-
icy—environmental; animal protec-
tion; or consumer-related—creates
an atmosphere of insecurity that can
be exploited by those who wish to un-
dermine protection. In the short
term, social policy seems to be the
loser. In the long term, however, the
viability of the international trade
regime will be at issue. Any WTO solu-
tion that does not take into account
social policy will inevitably create fur-
ther conflict rather than reduce or
eliminate tension. 
WTO rules are constitution in
nature: while they are vague and
broad in scope, they can also be rein-
terpreted to reflect changing public
perceptions and opinion. It is possible
to change the impact of WTO rules.
The question is whether WTO sup-
porters perceive the need to change
the rules to accommodate social val-
ues—values other than free-market
theory, comparative advantage, and







At the core of GATT theory is the con-
cept of “comparative advantage.”
Comparative advantage is the ratio-
nale underlying GATT Articles I (Most
Favored Nation) and III (Nation Treat-
ment).18 It is also the rationale used
to discredit the enforcement of envi-
ronmental and animal protection pol-
icy with standards that regulate the
production or process of goods.19 The
objective of comparative advantage
was first incorporated in an early
GATT decision known as the Belgian
Family Allowances.20
In the Belgian Family Allowances
case,21 Norway and Denmark brought
a complaint against Belgium because
Belgium placed a levy on products
purchased by public bodies from
states that did not have a system of
family allowances meeting specific re-
quirements. The panel decided that
Belgium’s levy violated Article I:1 and
possibly Article III and that the levy
was inconsistent with the spirit of
GATT.22
The rationale behind the decision
was comparative advantage. By re-
quiring that all countries have similar
social/economic requirements, Bel-
gium was undermining the compara-
tive advantage that some countries
gained by not having such economic
legislation. The objective of compara-
tive advantage was again articulated
in a later panel decision, United
States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930.23 In that case the panel found
that the purpose of Article III was to
“ensure effective equality of competi-
tive opportunity and to protect the
expectations on the competitive rela-
tionship between imported and do-
mestic products.”24
As compelling as the theory of com-
parative advantage may be in the eco-
nomic realm, it is not applicable to
social or moral policy typically em-
bodied in environmental or animal
protection regulation. At issue in
environmental or animal protection
policy-making is the legitimacy of the
goods produced, or more typically,
the legitimacy of the process by which
the goods are produced. To use a real
example, the European Union (EU)
has implemented a regulation ban-
ning the sale within the European
Union of pelts caught by using steel-
jaw leghold traps. At issue for the EU
electorate were ethical concerns
regarding the appropriateness of pro-
ducing a product in such a way as to
cause extreme animal suffering. Com-
parative advantage has no meaning in
this context. The issue is not whether
pelts can be produced at a lower eco-
nomic cost by using steel-jaw leghold
traps. Rather, the electorate deter-
mined that the moral cost of produc-
ing pelts in this manner outweighs
any economic advantage. The elec-
torate did not want such pelts, no
matter what the economic price.
Applying WTO rules to this type of
regulation results in decisions which
technically may be consistent within
the context of GATT, but which
nonetheless may be viewed as illegiti-
mate or irrational by national policy-
makers and their electorate.25 When
GATT rules are applied to social/mo-
ral regulations, the goal of preserving
comparative advantage is input into
social policy. This insures that eco-
nomic considerations will override or
outweigh the underlying social pur-
pose of the regulation. The net effect
is to stymie the ability of policymakers
to use the democratic process to bal-
ance competing policy interests of the
societies which they govern.
In a democratic political process,
the concerns of various stakeholders,
including affected industries, are bal-
anced so as to preclude an absolute
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win or absolute loss for any particular
segment of society. In this way, poli-
cymakers attempt to devise solutions
that harm the fewest number of
stakeholders. Establishing a presump-
tion that global economic concerns
must be given priority in the context
of noneconomic regulation promotes
autocratic, rather than democratic,
policy regimes. This is because a pre-
sumption of trade supremacy pre-
cludes policymakers from balancing





Trade agreement history reveals that
the original framework of GATT trade
principles and exceptions envisioned
a dynamic system that could balance
trade and domestic policy needs, as
well as global economic integration,
with national sovereignty.
Adopted in 1947, GATT-the-docu-
ment reflects a theoretical balance of
interests that has not characterized
interpretations by GATT-the-institu-
tion (now the WTO). That balance
between trade and environment or
other domestic policy interests is
achieved not only in the GATT, but in
numerous places throughout the
WTO Agreements adopted or modi-
fied in 1994. For example, the Pream-
ble to the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”)
provides:
no country should be prevented
from taking measures necessary...
for the protection of human, ani-
mal or plant life or health, or the
environment...subject to the re-
quirement that they are not ap-
plied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination be-
tween countries where the same
conditions prevail or a disguised
restriction on international trade. 26
Similarly, the Preamble to the
Agreement on the Application of San-
itary and Phytosanitary Measures
(the “SPS Agreement”) states that
“no Member should be prevented
from adopting or enforcing measures
necessary to protect human, animal,
or plant life or health, subject to” the
same requirements set forth in the
TBT Agreement.27 The Preamble to
the Agreement Establishing the WTO
specifically recognizes the need to 
[allow] for the optimal use of the
world’s resources in accordance
with the objective of sustainable
development, seeking both to
protect and preserve the environ-
ment and to enhance the means
for doing so in a manner consis-
tent with [countries’] respective
needs and concerns at different
levels of economic development.
While this language admittedly is
not proscriptive, it nonetheless con-
veys an implicit intent to balance eco-
nomic growth with social values.
Proscriptive language to this affect,
however, is contained in at least two
places in the WTO Agreements. Arti-
cle XIV (the exceptions clause) of the
General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices (the “GATS”) states
Subject to the requirement that
such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries
where like condition prevail, or a
disguised restriction on trade in
services, nothing in this Agree-
ment shall be construed to pre-
vent the adoption or enforcement
by any Member of measures:
(a) necessary to protect public
morals or to maintain public
order;
(b) necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant
life or health.
Similarly, Article XX of the GATT
provides that subject to the safe-
guards in its preamble, “nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any contracting party of measures”
(emphasis added) that are included
in the list of “general” exceptions.28
Article XX has three general excep-
tions that have great relevance to the
relationship between the WTO and
animal protection. They include mea-
sures:
(a) necessary to protect public
morals;
(b) necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health
...[and]
(g) relating to the conservation
of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures
are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions 
on domestic production 
or consumption.
Article XX dramatically protects the
measures listed against conflict with
every trade rule save the two safe-
guard tests written into the Article’s
preamble. By supplanting the sum of
all other trade considerations, the
safeguards play a crucial role in pre-
serving the balance between trade
and environment (and the other pro-
tected domestic policies). The pream-
ble requires that protected measures:
are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of [1]
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrim-
ination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or
[2] a disguised restriction on in-
ternational trade.
This framework for balancing trade
and noneconomic interests was de-
bated and designed well in advance of
GATT 1947.29 Two global trade docu-
ments developed the approach of bal-
ancing trade rules on one hand with
general exceptions and a preamble
with safeguards on the other, however
neither ever took effect. The first was
the 1927 International Convention
for the Abolition of Import and Ex-
port Prohibitions and Restrictions (or
the 1927 Convention), which was
drafted by committees and confer-
ences of the League of Nations. The
second was the charter for creation of
the International Trade Organization
(or the ITO Charter), which was
sponsored by committees of the Unit-
ed Nations. While the ITO Charter
was still being drafted after 1947, the
seminal proposals from the United
States and other countries did pre-
date the GATT, and they help to illus-
trate contemporaneous thinking.
As the first serious effort to pro-
mote global economic integration,
the deliberations over Article 4 of the
1927 Convention yield the most ex-
tensive historical record regarding
the structure and purpose of the
GATT general exceptions and their
preamble. From the start, the goal 
of the 1927 Convention was to devel-
op a formula for abolishing import
and export restrictions while preserv-
ing deference for legitimate noneco-
nomic policies.30
The League of Nations Economic
Committee (LoN Economic Commit-
tee) went so far as to describe the
Article 4 prohibitions of restrictions
on trade as “outside the scope” of the
Convention.31 It is clear from the dis-
cussion at several committee meet-
ings that the delegates distinguished
between “economic,” or “financial,”
regulations and “noneconomic” regu-
lations. The 1927 Convention was
designed to govern the former, not
the latter.
As an example, the delegation of
India expressed the view that only sov-
ereign nations could determine the
need for trade restrictions.32 The
Japanese delegate emphasized that
“[e]ach country must be allowed 
sufficient liberty to take those mea-
sures of prohibition or restriction
which it considered necessary for
non-financial or noneconomic rea-
sons....”33 In this context, the balance
between sovereignty and economic
integration was a central issue for the
1927 Convention.
The delegates frequently asked
whether particular laws of interest
would be covered by the proposed
general exceptions. These were most
often questions about quasi-econom-
ic regulations,34 but noneconomic
laws were discussed as well.35 In re-
sponse to the discussion of whether
various quasi-economic trade restric-
tions would be protected by Article 4,
the Austrian delegate raised the pos-
sibility of more detailed disclosure in
order to “get rid of the skeletons.”36
However, most delegations opposed
developing a detailed list or a policy
of strict construction. The committee
eventually arrived at a consensus that
generic exceptions would strike the
best balance. The British delegate ar-
ticulated the rationale upon which
the committee reached consensus:
If these noneconomic prohibi-
tions were not covered by the
scheme of the Convention [that
is, protected by general excep-
tions], there was ground for hope
that the danger of abuse would…
not be serious. In pursuing this
course the Conference would be
taking the only step possible at
this stage. It should not set up
machinery relating to these non-
economic prohibitions.…The
time has not yet come to include
noneconomic prohibitions and
restrictions, for Governments had
their special and peculiar obliga-
tions to their peoples in matters
to which they related.37
While generic exceptions would
strike the balance with sovereignty
concerns, the LoN Economic Com-
mittee also wanted to assure that
such broad exceptions would not lead
to abuses of the trade rules.38 At the
same time, the committee wanted to
avoid drafting the agreement “so
strictly and with so little regard to lo-
cal conditions as to make it impossi-
ble to obtain general adhesion.”39 In
this context the committee drafted
the two safeguards for the preamble
to Article 4. Thus did the 1927 Con-
vention explain its framework of us-
ing general exceptions and preamble
safeguards to preserve the balance
between trade and noneconomic poli-
cy interests.
The ITO Charter debates followed
much the same pattern. India, among
others, continued to express general
concern about losing its sovereignty
over noneconomic matters, particu-
larly resource conservation.40 The al-
ternating concern was still the poten-
tial for abusing the exceptions, as was
expressed by the delegates from
France and the United Kingdom,
among others.41
Based on a proposal from the Unit-
ed States, the ITO committee that
worked on general exceptions began
with a list of exceptions, but without
a preamble citing safeguards against
abuse. The committee inserted the
same structure of preamble safe-
guards that the 1927 Convention
used.42 The ITO preamble stated that
trade measures could not be “applied
in such a manner as to constitute a
means of arbitrary discrimination
between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade.”43
While the exact language of GATT
general exceptions continued to
develop, the framework of exceptions
with a preamble to safeguard against
abuses carried through from the 1927
Convention to the ITO Charter to
GATT 1947. That original framework
for maintaining a balance between
trade and noneconomic concerns






Recent GATT/WTO dispute panel de-
cisions have increasingly curtailed
the capacity of policymakers to use
trade measures for environmental or
animal protection purposes. For
example, Article III (the “National
Treatment” clause) of the GATT per-
mits the application of domestic reg-
ulations to foreign products so long
as they are not applied in excess of
those applied to “like” domestic prod-
ucts. The term “like product” has
been interpreted by dispute panels to
exclude regulation based on differ-
ences in production or processing
methods,45 which is often a key con-
cern for environmental or animal pro-
tection. 
Dispute panels also have narrowed
the exceptions contained in Article
XX of the GATT for measures “neces-
sary to protect human, animal, or
plant life or health” (Article XX(b)) or
“relating to the conservation of ex-
haustible natural resources” (Article
XX(g)). They have interpreted the
term “necessary” in Article XX(b) as a
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least-trade-restrictive test for health
measures.46 According to dispute pan-
els, trade measures are only “neces-
sary” if there is no other conceivable
means of achieving the policy goal. As
a result of this interpretation, dispute
panel members who are not experts in
the policy at stake have substituted
their judgment of what is “necessary”
for that of the legislature. They have
often rejected pragmatic solutions in
favor of hypotheticals that are not
politically feasible or have been tried
and have not worked.47
Dispute panels have also narrowed
the general exception in Article
XX(g), “relating to the conservation
of exhaustible resources.” Panels have
interpreted the term “relating to con-
servation” to mean “primarily aimed
at conservation,” which in turn has
been narrowly interpreted to permit
only those regulations that directly
accomplish the stated policy goal.
Regulations that accomplish the goal
indirectly or over a period of time do
not qualify for Article XX(g) protec-
tion.48 Although this rigorous stan-
dard has been modified somewhat by
the Appellate Body’s rulings in
Shrimp-Turtle AB and Reformulated
Gasoline, these cases have simply
constructed a new hurdle or test in
terms of the preamble (known as the
“chapeau”) to Article XX.
The Article XX chapeau provides:
Subject to the requirement that
such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries
where the same conditions pre-
vail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed
to prevent the adoption or en-
forcement by and contracting par-
ty of a measure.
When the Appellate Body addressed
the issue of the chapeau require-
ments in Reformulated Gasoline, it
applied what was essentially a “least-
trade-restrictive” test, although the
Appellate Body did not use this spe-
cific language.49 The Appellate Body
determined that an alternative means
could have been used to achieve the
conservation goal and therefore, the
measure was both arbitrary and un-
justifiable and a disguised restriction
on trade. In so deciding, the Appel-
late Body substituted its policy judg-
ment for that of U.S. environmental
regulators and found that an alterna-
tive non-trade restrictive method of
achieving U.S. policy could have been
equally effective from a conservation
point of view.”50 In Shrimp-Turtle AB,
the Appellate Body again substituted
its own judgment for that of domestic
environmental regulators, and again
found that alternatives measures
were available to achieve the particu-
lar conservation goal.51 These deci-
sions affect not only Article XX, but
also other WTO Agreements includ-
ing, the TBT Agreement, the SPS
Agreement, and GATS, where identi-
cal language is found.
The dynamic relationship between
local innovation and global solutions
is important. If the WTO uses its
power to block the use of trade mea-
sures for environmental or animal pro-
tection at the local (domestic) level,
the direct result will be to limit the
options at the global level. Limited
options at the multilateral level
means that multilateral environmen-
tal agreements (MEAs) lose their effi-
cacy. This in turn decreases the incen-
tive for multilateral environmental
cooperation, increases the pressure
for unilateral (domestic) action, and
consequently, may temper the enthu-
siasm of some governments for fur-
ther global economic integration,
thereby stunting the evolution of both




Previous GATT and WTO dispute res-
olution panels have suggested in dicta
that multilateral solutions are more
appropriate than unilateral action by
a single nation.52 While international
cooperation is ideal, it is not always
possible or even desirable for environ-
mental or animal protection prob-
lems.53 In most cases, international
cooperation is a slow process, with
necessary consensus resulting only at
the point of crisis. 
MEAs are the high-water mark of
pragmatic, bottom-up problem-solv-
ing. They do not emanate top-down
from an international center of
power. Most MEAs come into exis-
tence only after their substantive poli-
cies are first implemented at a “local”
level, either nationally or subnational-
ly within a state or province.
Consensus usually builds from the
bottom up. The first communities to
act are usually the ones that experi-
ence a problem more acutely than
others. For example, a maritime pro-
vince may feel the economic brunt of
depleted fishing stocks, or a nation
with particular religious or moral val-
ues may recoil at the commercial
treatment of animals it reveres.
A community may not be specially
or acutely affected by a problem, but
it may still see itself as part of the
problem and therefore demand do-
mestic regulation. For example, the
State of Vermont was one of the first
governments at any level to limit the
sale or use of chemicals that deplete
the ozone layer of the atmosphere.
Local initiative is essential to solv-
ing global-scale problems in three dif-
ferent ways. First, local initiatives
help build critical mass to make a real
ecological or economic difference on
a global scale. Second, the movement
toward a solution has to start some-
where: local initiatives are often the
first step toward political risk-taking
without which a global solution can-
not be achieved. Third, local initia-
tives are necessary as experiments.
Nation-states, whether they act alone
or in unison, depend on ideas that
work to solve environmental and ani-
mal protection problems. Global envi-
ronmental solutions cannot be devel-
oped in a test tube; the only laboratory
that works is policy implementation
on a national or subnational scale.
Many environmental and animal
protection problems do not respect
national borders. Although a single
domestic policy is a necessary begin-
ning, it is not sufficient in scope to
conserve a resource (like fish) or pro-
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tect a sentient species (like dolphins)
that live in the global commons.
The point at which nation-states
move beyond their own domestic con-
sensus is the point at which an MEA is
born. An MEA is to environmental
protection what the WTO is to global
economic integration. If the WTO’s
trade rules interfere with MEAs, the
risks to the global trade regime will
increase, not diminish: if local and na-
tional leaders are prevented from de-
vising environmental solutions that
work, they and their electorate will
associate the WTO with their own po-
litical and environmental impotence.
If the WTO does not achieve an effec-
tive balance for trade and environ-
ment, the movement for global eco-





tion has led to the adoption of more
than 180 treaties or agreements to
protect the global environment and
conserve natural resources. The need
for continued international coopera-
tion is undisputed by trade and envi-
ronmental experts alike. Internation-
al cooperation increases the re-
sources available for enforcement,
monitoring, and scientific innovation.
It can also be a mechanism for pro-
viding technological, educational,
and monitoring resources to coun-
tries that do not have the resources to
address a particular problem. If MEAs
are to be a viable option for address-
ing global and regional animal-relat-
ed problems, they will need enforce-
ment tools that work.
Developing the enforcement pow-
ers of MEA organizations is conceptu-
ally and practically difficult.54 Histori-
cally, enforcement powers have been
inextricably tied to the concept of
sovereignty, and only nation-states
have the sovereign right to enforce
laws within their own jurisdiction.
With some exceptions, the concept of
enforcement jurisdiction is territori-
ally based.55 Theoretically, no interna-
tional juridical body may interfere
with that right, and granting an MEA
organization enforcement powers
may result in infringing upon the sov-
ereignty of its member countries. Be-
cause of the limited options for inter-
national enforcement, the use of
trade measures by MEA members will
increasingly become necessary for
enforcement. While member states
have the means to implement and
enforce MEA objectives within their
territory through their police powers,
they have few means of implementing
and enforcing objectives outside their
territorial boundaries, even when
their interests are directly threat-
ened. This would suggest an increase
in attempts to use trade measures to
implement and enforce both national
and international environmental and
animal protection policy.
The WTO’s Committee on Trade
and Environment (CTE) has addressed
the issue of the relationship between
the WTO and MEAs but has come to
no conclusions. The question of whe-
ther MEA-derived trade measures are
WTO-consistent is unresolved. There
have been no GATT or WTO chal-
lenges to such trade measures. This is
primarily because there are so few of
them.56 A third treaty, the Conven-
tion on International Trade in Endan-
gered and Threatened Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (CITES), regulates
commercial trade in endangered and
threatened animal and plant species
through the use of a trade permitting
system, but doesn’t specifically au-
thorize the use of trade measures or
sanctions. The permitting system is
basically an honor system. Members
agree to abide by their obligations in
good faith. The only recourse to trade
measures per se has been in the form
of a recommendation from the CITES
Standing Committee, the juridical
body which has authority over such
matters. In September 1993 the
Standing Committee issued a deci-
sion which provided interalia, “Parties
should consider implementing strict-
er domestic measures up to and in-
cluding prohibition in trade in wild-
life species now” (see Press Release 
of CITES Secretariat, September 9,
1993, announcing Decision of the
Standing Committee, para. 6). This
came in response to the most visible
use of MEA-authorized trade mea-
sures yet—the U.S. imposition of
trade measures against China and
Taiwan for the continued trade in rhi-
noceros horn in violation of CITES. In
that case, the CITES Standing Com-
mittee, the judicial body with author-
ity over such matters, issued a deci-
sion strongly recommending that
Parties “consider implementing
stricter domestic measures up to and
including prohibition in trade in
wildlife species now.”57 The purpose
of the decision was to encourage
China and Taiwan to comply with
CITES. The United States took action
by imposing a ban on the importation
of animal-related products. Because
neither China nor Taiwan was a 
member of GATT, no GATT challenge
was possible.
Some governments, most notably
those of the United States and the
European Union, assert that trade
measures taken to enforce MEAs are
consistent with WTO rules and that
MEAs and the WTO are theoretically
international equals.58 The U.S. Trade
Representative’s office has said this
repeatedly in public briefings in order
to quell the qualms of environmental
and animal protection advocates
regarding the WTO.
Such statements, however, are at
odds with U.S. policy positions. While
claiming that nothing in the WTO
preempts the use of trade measures
by MEAs, the U.S. government has ac-
tively pursued a policy of ensuring
that WTO rules trump MEA policy by
including “savings clauses” in new
MEAs in which the use of trade mea-
sures are most likely to occur. For
example, in the Biosafety Protocol ne-
gotiations, the United States pushed
vigorously for language that would
ensure that members did not take
action which would interfere with
implementation and enforcement of
Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, a WTO
Agreement.59 (A savings clause is the
legal mechanism by which countries
agree and ensure that a new agree-
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ment does not supercede obligations
under an existing international agree-
ment, such as the WTO.60 It is the
means by which the United States
and others are ensuring that MEAs do
not supercede WTO rules.)
Where Do We
Go From Here?
The conflict between the WTO and
national and international animal pro-
tection legislation is ultimately a
question of social policy and sover-
eignty. These concepts stand between
the WTO and its vision of a global
economy. The thrust of this chapter
has been to emphasize how the origi-
nal framework of GATT trade princi-
ples and exceptions envisioned the
task of striking a balance not only be-
tween trade and environment/animal
protection, but between economic in-
tegration and sovereignty as well. That
balance has been lost as trade nego-
tiators push to further integrate the
global economy, imposing free-market
theories and ignoring social policy.
At issue is the type of global society
being created by the current push for
global economic integration. From an
animal protection perspective, cur-
rent WTO rules create a global soci-
ety devoid of humane considerations,
where the bottom line is profit and
competition, rather than coopera-
tion, compassion, and conservation.
The former promotes over-consump-
tion—characterized by a need to cre-
ate increased market access—while
the latter helps encourage responsi-
ble consumerism. Economists would
argue that WTO rules form a value-
neutral system. But the impact of the
system belies such statements. WTO/
GATT case law and practical applica-
tion of WTO rules reveal a global eco-
nomic order that shuns ethical con-
cerns and brands them as “technical
trade barriers.” The imposition of
comparative advantage to social
norms ensures that ethical considera-
tions do not affect the marketplace in
any meaningful way. Instead, low-cost
consumerism has become the global
economic mantra. It is a system that
lacks grace and long- term durability.
The system is subject to attack pre-
cisely because it has no moral recti-
tude. The original balance envisioned
must be regained if the WTO hopes to
retain public legitimacy.
Revising the Rules
From an animal welfare perspective,
revision or reinterpretation of WTO
rules is essential to making the glob-
al economy animal friendly. Of great-
est concern are the issues of national
treatment, burden of proof, the scope
of the GATT Article XX Exceptions,
including the chapeau (which has im-
plications for several other agree-
ments including, the SPS Agreement,
the TBT Agreement and GATS) and
the issue of risk assessment with
respect to the SPS Agreement.
National Treatment
Article III of GATT provides for nation-
al treatment on internal taxation and
regulations, that is, all similar pro-
ducts must be treated in a like man-
ner. For example, Article III(2) specifi-
cally provides:
The products of the territory of
any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other
contracting party shall not be
subject, directly or indirectly, to
internal taxes or other internal
charges of any kind in excess of
those applied, directly or indirect-
ly, to like domestic products (em-
phasis added).
Dispute panels have interpreted
Article III to preclude internal regula-
tions governing the production or
processing of a product.61 From 
an environmental and animal protec-
tion perspective, however, the way a
product is produced is often more
important than the product itself. 
In the life-cycle of a product, the pro-
duction process may be where envi-
ronmental degradation or animal 
suffering occurs.62
The precautionary principle, ac-
cepted at the UN Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development and else-
where,63 embodies the belief that
environmental degradation should be
prevented rather than controlled,
that conclusive proof of harm should
not be a prerequisite to environmen-
tal or animal welfare regulation, and
that even limited evidence of a causal
nexus between production and harm
should be sufficient to justify regula-
tion. Production and process method
(PPM) measures are often the most
effective means of preventing environ-
mental degradation and promoting
animal welfare. One of the main goals
of the animal protection community
is to make trade rules acknowledge
the value of process-related standards
and thereby embody the precaution-
ary principle.
PPMs can be divided into two cate-
gories: “product-related PPM require-
ments” and “non-product-related
PPM requirements.” A product-relat-
ed PPM must be embodied in and
somehow alter the final characteris-
tics of a product. An example of a
product-related PPM is the EU regu-
lation requiring heat treatment of
wood to prevent the importation and
proliferation of nematodes. The heat
treatment alters the chemical proper-
ties of the wood, which makes results
of the process physically measurable
and detectable.
A non-product-related PPM affects
the production or processing of the
product, but it is not actually incor-
porated or reflected in the final prod-
uct. Examples of non-product-related
PPMs are the EU regulation banning
the importation of certain fur prod-
ucts caught in steel-jaw leghold traps
and the U.S. law banning the impor-
tation of fish caught in driftnets that
exceed the UN standard of 2.5 kilo-
meters.
Only product-related PPMs are
specifically permitted under GATT64;
non-product-related PPMs are not.
However, in two GATT cases, Tuna-
Dolphin I and Tuna-Dolphin II, dispute
panels found that non-product-related
environmental PPMs violate GATT. In
both, the panel held that a U.S. law re-
stricting imports of canned yellowfin
tuna caught using purse-seine nets (a
“process” or “production” regulation)
were quantitative restrictions prohib-
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ited under Article IX of GATT. More-
over, the U.S. regulation was not an
internal measure as contemplated
under Article III65 of GATT because
the U.S. law did not regulate tuna as a
product. Rather, it regulated the
method by which tuna was harvested.
Both panels ignored the distinction
between tuna caught by encircling
dolphins with purse-seine nets and
tuna caught by other methods, be-
cause this was a distinction based on
production, not the physical charac-
teristics of the tuna. The panels con-
cluded that the U.S. law was discrimi-
natory because the United States
banned the import of tuna from any
country that did not adopt a dolphin
conservation regime comparable to
that of the United States.
Many animal welfare laws—such as
the EU Leghold Regulation and Cos-
metics Testing Directive and the U.S.
Marine Mammal Protection Act, Wild
Bird Conservation Act, Humane
Slaughter Act, sea turtle protection
law, African Elephant Conservation
Act, and High Seas Driftnet Enforce-
ment Act—incorporate non-product-
related PPMs. Under the reasoning of
both the Tuna Dolphin I and II deci-
sions, these and many other noneco-
nomic laws are vulnerable to a WTO
challenge.
To remedy this, the WTO Council of
Ministers should establish an inter-
pretive rule (giving as little discretion
as possible to dispute panels or the
Appellate Body) that the term “like
product” as used in Article III, and as
applied to environmental and animal
protection policy, permits differentia-
tion based on process or production
methods so long as the environmental
and animal protection measures are
not intended as disguised restrictions
on trade. Such types of products and
production method standards should
be permissible at both the domestic
level (i.e., unilaterally) and in terms of
MEA enforcement. Such an interpre-
tation by the Council of Ministers
would reflect the principle that envi-
ronmentally sound “production or
process” methods are an essential
component of the precautionary ap-
proach. The WTO should provide the
following interpretative guidance:
(a) Discrimination: Domestic produc-
ers should be prevented from utilizing
production or process methods which
foreign producers are either de facto
or de jure prohibited from using if
they want market access.
(b) Assistance to developing coun-
tries: If developing country producers
are affected, sufficient financial and
technological assistance (including
transfer of technology) should be
forthcoming from the regulating
country in order that the developing
country producer can bring its pro-
duction into compliance with the
PPM standard.
(c) Dispute panel composition: To en-
sure an accurate and comprehensive
review of disputes involving animal
protection or environmental concerns,
dispute panels considering newly inter-
preted Article III defenses should
include at least one panelist who is a
recognized environmental or animal
welfare expert.
Burden of Proof
As noted above, the plain language of
GATT Article XX is that “nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any contracting party of measures”
(emphasis added)that are included in
the list of “general” exceptions.66
Thus, Article XX preserved the histor-
ical deference to sovereignty in the
sphere of noneconomic policy.
Unfortunately, GATT dispute pan-
els have required countries defending
their laws under Article XX to carry
the burden of proof to justify use of a
trade measure to enforce a environ-
mental objective.67 This interpreta-
tion was codified within the GATT
1994 Dispute Settlement Under-
standing (DSU), which provides that:
the action is considered prima
facie to constitute a case of nulli-
fication or impairment. This
means that there is normally a
presumption that a breach of the
rules has an adverse impact on
other Members...[and] it shall be
up to the Member against whom
the complaint has been brought
to rebut the charge.68
Although it is now codified in the
DSU, this interpretation on burden of
proof is inconsistent with the frame-
work of the GATT regarding Article
XX exceptions. First, the very purpose
of Article XX was to countenance the
kind of “adverse impacts” to which
the DSU refers. Second, Article XX ex-
plicitly provides that except for the
two safeguards built into its pream-
ble,69 “nothing in this Agreement” pre-
vents a member nation from adopting
or enforcing exempted measures. The
dictionary definition of “nothing” as it
is used (as a noun) in Article XX
means “no thing at all” or “no share,
element or part.”70 In other words, for
purposes of Article XX general excep-
tions, a dispute panel may consider
only the safeguards in the preamble—
otherwise, no dispute settlement pre-
sumptions, no externally imposed lim-
itations on policy alternatives,
nothing. As one commentator puts it,
“if the ‘nothing in this Agreement’
clause in Article XX means what it
says, why are any conditions outside
the Preamble relevant?”71
The WTO should adopt the position
that the DSU presumption that a
defending nation must bear the bur-
den of proof does not apply to defens-
es under Article XX. To the contrary,
the policy of deference implied by
Article XX shifts the burden of proof
on the complaining nation, once a




Over the years, GATT dispute panels
have narrowed the Article XX excep-
tions. This narrowing also affects sev-
eral other WTO Agreements, including
the TBT Agreement, SPS Agreement,
and GATS.72 As with the burden of
proof, the restrictive interpretations
go beyond the plain language and his-
torical deference, which the structure
of GATT provided in order that sover-
eign nations could define their own
interests regarding noneconomic mat-
ters, so long as the Article XX safe-
guards are applied.
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Protecting Life or Health
Article XX(b) exempts measures that
are “necessary to protect human, ani-
mal or plant life or health.” The gen-
eral scope of this exemption is con-
strained on two fronts. The first
involves interpretation of whether a
given measure is “necessary,” and the
second involves the meaning of “life
or health.”
The Meaning of “Necessity”73
WTO Dispute panels have interpreted
the term “necessary” from the “trade
impact” point of view. The initial point
of inquiry has been: What is the im-
pact on trade and is this impact strict-
ly “necessary?” The development of
the least-trade-restrictive “test” was
an attempt to judicially codify an eas-
ily applicable test to determine the
impact of various health and safety
measures on trade. This test, however,
ignores the deference that the struc-
ture of the WTO provided to sovereign
nations to define their own noneco-
nomic interests.
Democratic legislatures are de-
signed to draft measures that balance
competing interests; the result is a
politically feasible compromise. Rare-
ly do consumers or affected industries
get all they want. But WTO panels
have ruled that in order for a human
or animal health measure to be “nec-
essary,” a defending nation must
prove that it chose the least-WTO-
inconsistent measure available based
upon the panel’s own speculation
about what the alternatives might
be.74 An interpretation of “necessary”
that requires sovereign states to
choose the least-WTO-inconsistent
measure to qualify under Article XX
exceptions denies any deference to
national problem-solving as envi-
sioned by the drafters of GATT and
the earlier trade agreements. This
runs counter to the deference to na-
tional problem-solving envisioned by
the drafters of GATT and the earlier
trade agreements. There is virtually
always a less-trade-restrictive alterna-
tive. No WTO panel can presume to
know what action is “necessary”
based on the diverse factors that a
legislature must take into account.75
If the balance between trade con-
cerns and deference to sovereign na-
tions in the noneconomic realm is to
be preserved, any “test” regarding
what is “necessary” should be defined
from the perspective of the relevant
legislative body. A WTO panel does
not have the capacity to evaluate whe-
ther an environmental or animal-re-
lated threat is real or significant. Fac-
tors relevant to determining the
scope of the environmental threat
include public interest in the per-
ceived problem by constituents other
than an “affected industry,” the
degree of public discussion about
available options, and limitations on
effective enforcement due to the
scope of the problem.
The Meaning of “Life and Health”
76
A dispute panel could interpret the
meaning of “life or health” as parallel
to the definition used in the SPS
Agreement, which is limited to “risks
arising from the entry, establishment
or spread of pests, diseases, disease-
carrying organisms, or disease-caus-
ing organisms.”77 This definition, how-
ever, excludes environmental threats
to animal life or health—such as loss
of habitat, excessive hunting, and pol-
lution and other ecological imbalance
caused by human commerce—as well
as humane considerations.
When GATT 1947 was being drafted,
there was little discussion of the scope
of Article XX(b), perhaps because it
was so similar to language in the ITO
Charter, the 1927 Convention, and bi-
lateral treaties; it had become “boiler-
plate,” in the words of a U.S. dele-
gate.78 Prior to the 1927 Convention,
the LoN Economic Committee recom-
mended a health exception that in-
cluded protection from disease and
“degeneration or extinction.”79 This
additional phrase was dropped from
the text adopted by the Convention,
but it was retained in an explanatory
protocol to the Convention.80
The model for this GATT exception
was established when the U.S. and
British delegations proposed simplify-
ing the 1927 exception even further
into its present form.81 Sanitary and
phytosanitary measures were clearly
the foremost concern. However, there
is no hint on the record that the sim-
plification of Article XX(b) language
was anything more than a decision to
use the most general phrase possible
to include the various health risks
that were mentioned in predecessor
documents. The movement away from
detailed list-type definitions to gener-
ic definitions is consistent with a pol-
icy of GATT deference to sovereign
articulation of policy purposes.
A much broader interpretation of
Article XX(b) can be supported by
both the plain language of the terms
“life” and “health” as well as by the
drafting history of this provision.
Defining “life” and “health” as per-
taining only to sanitary and phytosan-
itary measures focuses the inquiry on
“impact” or harm to others (that is,
the spread of disease). The terms
“life” and “health,” however, also
have meaning in the context of the
impact on the individual: How is the
individual affected? For example, in
the human realm, human rights viola-
tions could significantly affect an
individual. Similarly, the conditions in
a dog breeding facility could signifi-
cantly affect the life or health of an
individual dog.
Possible Solutions
As a solution, either the WTO Council
of Ministers or the Appellate Body
established under the DSU82 should
establish a new “interpretive rule”
with respect to the term “necessary”
as used in Article XX. The rule should
focus on the scope of the moral,
health, or conservation problem as it
is perceived by the sovereign legislator
or regulator. Factors such as public
interest in the issue, enforcement
limitations, and public debate about
various policy options could be con-
sidered by a dispute panel to deter-
mine the scope of the problem as
perceived by the legislature. The ne-
cessity to protect life or health should
not limit WTO members to only a the-
oretical measure that is least incon-
sistent with the WTO Agreement.
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This precludes solutions that are
politically or practically feasible and
ignores the original spirit of providing
a general exception.
Furthermore, the meaning of “life
or health” should not be limited to
“sanitary or phytosanitary” concerns.
Particularly in the case of animals, life
or health is often dependent on pro-
tecting animals from undue stress,
pain, loss of habitat, or other environ-
mental threats. A new WTO interpre-
tative rule should be established to
clarify this point. 
Conserving Exhaustible
Resources
Article XX(g) exempts measures
“relating to the conservation of ex-
haustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in con-
junction with restrictions on domes-
tic production or consumption.”
GATT panels have interpreted broad
terms like “relating to” conservation
and “in conjunction with” domestic
restrictions very narrowly. The plain
meaning of “relating to” would sug-
gest that either a direct or indirect
causal link between the perceived
harm and the chosen mode of regula-
tion would suffice. Past GATT panels,
however, have interpreted the term,
“relating to,” to mean “primarily
aimed at,” which in turn has been
interpreted to require a direct causal
link between the asserted policy goal
and the means chosen to attain the
goal.83 This narrow interpretation has
permitted panels to substitute their
subjective judgment regarding what
constitutes “effective policy” for that
of sovereign legislators, which contra-
venes the purpose of the Article XX
exceptions.
Another way of limiting the appli-
cation of this exemption is to narrow
the substantive scope of what is
“exhaustible.” Some analysts have
suggested that “exhaustible re-
sources” include only minerals that
are available in finite quantities.84
However, within the constraints of
such a standard, the WTO precludes
the use of an environmental excep-
tion to safeguard creative responses
by MEAs and sovereign states to ad-
dress some of the most serious envi-
ronmental problems of our time
(such as ozone depletion).
If the term “exhaustible resources”
is narrowed, the only alternative avail-
able to a country whose environmen-
tal measure is challenged is to argue
that the trade-related measure fall
within another exception (public
morals or life/health) that has a
“necessity” test. As previously noted,
the term “necessary” has been con-
strued by previous GATT panels to
require that only the least-trade-
restrictive policy option be imple-
mented. In either case, the balance
envisioned in Article XX between
GATT authority in the economic and
financial realm and sovereign author-
ity in the noneconomic realm will be
eviscerated.
The question of whether a resource
is exhaustible is a factual one that is
not limited by whether a resource can
renew itself. Obviously, species can
die to the point of extinction. While
the ecosystem of trees and oceans
renews the atmosphere, a significant
change through global warming or
ozone depletion can exhaust the spe-
cific balance that makes the atmos-
phere a life-supporting resource.
While rivers renew their own purity,
pollution can overwhelm their re-
storative powers.
In this case, dispute panels have
recognized that not just minerals but
also animals, plants, and ecosystems
can be exhausted.85 The risk is that
without interpretive guidance from
the Council of Ministers, future pan-
els will not continue to give deference
to member-nations’ assessment of
whether a resource is exhaustible.
The WTO should require that dis-
pute panels respect the plain mean-
ing of the term “relating to conserva-
tion,” which could include trade-
related environmental measures that
either directly or indirectly achieve
the stated environmental objective.
Alternate tests (such as “primarily
aimed at”) that rely on the subjective
judgment of a dispute panel regard-
ing the underlying economic impact
of a trade-related environmental mea-
sure are not appropriate.
Dispute panels should also contin-
ue to apply an open analysis of whe-
ther a resource is exhaustible, not a
more limited definition based on pre-
sumed categories of what is exhaust-
ible and what is not.
Public Morals
GATT Article XX(a) and GATS Article
XIV(a) exempt measures that are
“necessary to protect public
morals.”86 While this is one of the
most relevant GATT exceptions
regarding animal protection, it is
mentioned last because it has not
been used before, at least in the con-
text of a GATT challenge before a dis-
pute panel.
Like Article XX(b), XX(a) requires
a measure to be “necessary” to
accomplish its purpose. The previous
comments regarding the term “nec-
essary” in the context of Article
XX(b) are equally applicable here.
The difference between the two ex-
ceptions is that articulation of public
morals by policymakers is an inher-
ently subjective task, much more so
that determining whether there is a
threat to life or health. Therefore, the
legislative determination of whether a
measure is “necessary” to serve a sub-
jective purpose can be likewise more
of a subjective judgment.
The history of debate from the
1927 Convention through the adop-
tion of GATT 1947 confirms a com-
mon sense understanding that the
scope of the public morals exception
is broader than the other exceptions
and that nation-states were allowed
to determine public morals within the
context of their own culture.
The history of trade agreements
since the League of Nations shows
that protecting public morals has
been a constant concern and that lan-
guage has gradually evolved from spe-
cific to more generic terms. As noted
above, Article XX(a) of GATT 1947
had two predecessor documents,
which never took effect. The first was
article 4(2) of the 1927 Convention.
The second was article 45(1)(a)(I) of
the initial proposals for the ITO Char-
ter, which was sponsored by commit-
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tees of the United Nations.
The 1927 Convention exempted
“prohibitions or restrictions imposed
on moral or humanitarian grounds.”87
Like the other exceptions in Article 4,
the Economic Committee reported
that moral prohibitions or restric-
tions on trade were “outside the
scope” of the Convention.88 The dele-
gates frequently asked whether par-
ticular laws of interest would be cov-
ered by the proposed general
language. Examples of morally based
trade restrictions included prohibi-
tions on obscene materials (Ire-
land)89 and prohibitions on lotteries
(Egypt).90 The 1927 Conference
ended with a morals exception close
to what the Economic Committee ori-
ginally recommended, except that
the language on morals became even
more general.
As drafted by the Economic Com-
mittee of the 1927 Convention, the
morals exception covered trade re-
strictions for “moral or humanitarian
reasons or for the suppression of
improper traffic, provided that the
manufacture of and trade in the goods
to which the prohibitions relate are
also prohibited or restricted in the inte-
rior of the country” (emphasis add-
ed).91 The Conference shortened the
entire section to read, “moral or hu-
manitarian grounds.”92 While there
was no comment on why the Confer-
ence moved to shorten the section,
its action was consistent with the po-
licies of (1) using the most generic
language, and (2) using the safe-
guards in the preamble to protect
against discrimination or disguised
trade barriers.
Apart from the generic exception
debate, there was no further discus-
sion of whether animal or environ-
mental protection would be consid-
ered a moral exception to trade rules.
However, it is worth noting that dur-
ing the same period, another branch
of the League of Nations was negoti-
ating a convention that included a
clause to prevent unnecessary suffer-
ing of animals during transport.93
This suggests that in 1927 interna-
tional institutions recognized animal
protection as both a moral issue and
a sanitary or phytosanitary issue, as
they do today.
The morals exception within the
ITO Charter was initially proposed by
the United States as part of its com-
prehensive charter proposal. The pro-
posed exception covered measures
“necessary to protect public mor-
als,”94 which is the same language as
Article XX(a) of GATT 1947. When
compared to its predecessor langu-
age from article 4(2) of the 1927
Convention, “moral or humanitarian
grounds,” the ITO proposal carried on
the trend toward ever more general
language.
There was literally no comment on
the general exceptions recommended
by the United States within the first
ITO report (the London confer-
ence).95 Nor was there further com-
ment on the “public morals” excep-
tion in later reports. It is clear that
the drafters of GATT 1947 began
their work with the pre-1947 ITO
Charter drafts, which were based on
the original U.S. proposal.96
Without any further insight into
the internal U.S. rationale for adopt-
ing “public morals” rather than its
older 1927 cousin, “moral and hu-
manitarian grounds,” the most likely
explanation remains the preference
for using general terms rather than
specific examples.97 For example,
“humanitarian” concerns would be a
type of “public morals,” and therefore
the broader term,“public morals,” is
all that is necessary.
The issue of whether trade-related
environmental or animal protection
measures are protected by Article
XX(a) is more than simply a theoreti-
cal question. Many of the highly po-
liticized trade challenges that have
occurred, or are likely to occur in the
near future, are animal related. It was
the infamous tuna-dolphin dispute
that first alerted broad sectors of the
international public to the limits on
law-making authority posed by trade
agreements. Policies affecting sea tur-
tles (as symbolized in 1999 by the
widely photographed costumed demon-
strators) became synonymous with the
WTO Seattle Ministerial.
Trade conflicts involving animals
will likely increase public ire about
trade agreements. It would seem pru-
dent, therefore, for the WTO to ad-
dress the issue of how Article XX(a)
applies to trade-related animal pro-
tection measures and provide inter-
pretive guidance to ensure that dis-
pute resolution panels afford the
appropriate deference to sovereignty
that the drafters of GATT envisioned
under the Article XX exceptions.
As in the case of life or health, the
phrase “necessary to protect public
morality” should be interpreted to in-
clude solutions that are practical and
politically feasible, which would pre-
serve the original spirit of providing a
general exception.
Public morals are defined by each
respective nation based on its unique
cultural, ethical, or religious norms.
A generic deference to national deter-
mination of public morals clearly in-
cludes protection of animals, among





The Appellate Body in both Reformu-
lated Gasoline AB and Shrimp-Turtle
AB employed a type of least-trade-
restrictive test in analyzing the mean-
ing of the chapeau to Article XX. In so
doing, it substituted its judgment for
that of domestic environmental poli-
cymakers by determining that, from a
conservation perspective, nontrade-
related alternatives were available to
achieve the conservation goals in
question. It also made the language
of the chapeau nearly equivalent to
the WTO interpretative meaning of
the word “necessary,” thus obfuscat-
ing the meaning of particular words.
The result is an overall presumption
that trade will always preempt social
concerns.
In order to remedy this problem,
the WTO Council of Ministers should
instruct the Appellate Body to take
heed of Article 31 of the Vienna Con-
vention of the Law of Treaties, which
provides: “A treaty shall be interpret-
ed in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to
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the terms of the treaty in their con-
text and in the light of its object and
purpose.” The ordinary meaning of
the word “arbitrary,” as defined in
The American Heritage Dictionary of
English Language, is: “determined by
chance, whim or impulse, and not by
necessity, reason, or principle,” while
the meaning of “unjustifiable” is:
“impossible to excuse, pardon, or jus-
tify.” Application of the chapeau (or
in the case of other WTO Agree-
ments, where similar language is
used) should be limited to an inquiry
of whether the relevant policymakers
had a rationale, unrelated to trade,
for choosing the policy mechanism in
dispute. If there is a non-trade ratio-
nale, regardless of whether a universe
of other possible alternatives exist,
the law or regulation in question
should, as a matter of law, meet the
requirements of the chapeau. Appli-
cation of any other rule results in an
infringement by trade experts on non-




By its terms the SPS Agreement specif-
ically applies to risks to animals result-
ing from disease, contaminants, tox-
ins, additives, and a host of other
harms.99 It applies both to risks to
humans arising from contaminants
from animal food sources and to direct
harm to animals. Thus, the SPS Agree-
ment is very important from an animal
welfare perspective. Despite this, there
have been no animal cases arising
under the SPS Agreement. Although
the Beef Hormone100 case involved
questions of human health rather than
animal harm, the case is instructive of
how a panel would treat the issue of
risk assessment should a case arise in
the context of animal life or health.
In Beef Hormone the dispute panel
found that Article 2.2 of the SPS
Agreement required that risk assess-
ments specifically be based on scien-
tific principles and that SPS measures
could not be maintained without suf-
ficient scientific evidence.101 Al-
though the panel determined that 
the European Union had conducted a
risk assessment,102 it said that the
European Union nonetheless provid-
ed no evidence that it had taken such
assessments into account in enacting
the measure in question.103 The panel
also determined that application of
the precautionary principle did not
override the explicit wording of Arti-
cles 5.1 and 5.2 and that the precau-
tionary principle had been incorporat-
ed in inter alia Article 5.7.104
Furthermore, according to the panel,
none of the scientific evidence pre-
sented by the European Union specifi-
cally addressed the identifiable risk
arising to human health from the hor-
mones in question if so-called “good
practice” was followed. Because of
these and other reasons, the panel
found that the EU hormone ban was
not based on a risk assessment as
required by Article 5.1 of the SPS and,
in addition, the ban resulted in dis-
crimination or a disguised restriction
on international trade and therefore
was inconsistent with Article 5.5. 
The Appellate Body agreed with the
panel that the precautionary principle
does not override the provisions of the
SPS Agreement. It reversed the pan-
el’s decision, however, with respect to
Article 5.2 and whether the SPS
required a measure to be “based on” a
risk assessment. The Appellate Body
found that as long as the measure is
reasonably supported by the conclu-
sions of a risk assessment, no proof
that the measure was based on that
assessment is necessary,105 nor does a
particular risk assessment need to re-
flect a “majority” scientific view-
point.106 The Appellate Body nonethe-
less held that the EU measure was not
consistent with the SPS because,
among other reasons, the evidence
presented concluded that there was
little risk so long as “good practice”
was followed and the EU presented no
evidence regarding the risk resulting
from nonconformity.107
There are many potential harms to
animals for which no risk assessment
could be conducted before severe
harm occurred. Risk assessments are
based on scientific evidence which it-
self is typically based on years (or at
least some quantifiable amount) of
empirical evidence. The die-off of the
Monarch butterflies is an example of
harm that can only be quantified after
severe harm has occurred.108 The in-
troduction of a foreign invasive spe-
cies is another example where empir-
ical evidence is often gathered after
harm has occurred. For an SPS Agree-
ment to effectively protect animals
from harm (rather than simply to en-
sure that no barriers to trade occur)
the WTO Council of Ministers or the
Appellate Body must apply the pre-
cautionary principle are part of cus-
tomary international law.109 This will
safeguard actions taken when no ef-
fective risk assessment can be con-
ducted before harm occurs.
Conclusion
The WTO, with its eighteen global
trade agreements including the GATT,
represents a vision of global economic
reform. It also represents fifty years of
work by multinational corporations,
which now represent a powerful con-
stituency for the WTO as a top-down
instrument to promote the supremacy
of trade rules over nontrade objectives
such as animal welfare.
The animal welfare movement and
the broader environmental movement
are no less a vision of global reform.
The evolution of well over one hun-
dred MEAs represents a bottom-up
process of multilateral cooperation.
This progress is now at risk because
the WTO agreements threaten to
stunt the further evolution of viable
enforcement mechanisms for MEAs.
The trade agreements pose an even
greater threat to domestic trade mea-
sures that protect animals and the
environment.
The failure of the WTO, and before
it the GATT, to defer to nontrade poli-
cies is a threat to the bottom-up pro-
cess of developing a global economy
that is humane and environmentally
sustainable, not merely efficient and
profitable. We have stressed that this
democratic deficit on the part of
trade institutions is not only a threat
to animal welfare and other non-trade
objectives; ultimately, it also risks the
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sustainability of the trade institutions
themselves. This argument is based
on political reality.
A nationwide study of public atti-
tudes toward trade reveals that 62
percent of the American people are
comfortable with the pace of trade li-
beralization.110 But in even stronger
numbers, Americans believe that en-
vironmental problems are global in
nature (78 percent) and that there
should be more international agree-
ments on environmental standards
(77 percent).111 Three-quarters of the
American people support the proposi-
tion: “Countries should be able to re-
strict the imports of products if they
are produced in a way that damages
the environment, because protecting
the environment is at least as impor-
tant as trade.”112 But even more spe-
cifically, 72 percent of Americans fa-
vor restricting the importation of
tuna from Mexico because the fishing
methods kill dolphins, and 63 percent
favor restricting the importation of
shrimp from both India and Pakistan
because the fishing methods kill sea
turtles.113 In short, the diverse inter-
ests at the Seattle Ministerial express-
ing resistance to trade rules were not
a fringe movement, as trade promot-
ers have argued, but a reflection of
public opinion on a massive scale.
The American people know that
they can enjoy the benefits of free
trade without sacrificing their hu-
mane and environmental values. If
trade institutions, including the trade
representatives of the United States,
persist in promoting trade supremacy
over the nontrade values that define
our democratic society, then those in-
stitutions are the ones at risk of be-
coming endangered species.
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